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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the concept of normative power rivalry. Assuming that normative 
power can lead to rivalry between international actors, the conditions under which 
the European Union’s norms can cause rivalry and conflict are investigated. The 
hypothesis holds that the greater the clash in relevant norms, the more likely 
differences between them will lead to conflict. In order to test this supposition, a 
constructivist approach is developed and applied in a case study of the interaction 
between Russia and the European Union on the issue of Kosovo. It is argued that the 
EU’s and Russia’s interpretations of sovereignty, international law and multilateralism 
conflicted, thus leading to normative power rivalry over Kosovo. 
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1. Introduction: Normative Power from a Different Perspective 
 
The concept of normative power enjoys great attention in the field of European 
studies. It is typically used to describe the European Union’s unique influence on the 
international system. This normative power is generally regarded as something 
positive, contributing to the maintenance of peace, the defence of human rights 
and the spread of democracy. This paper looks at the concept from a different 
perspective, analysing normative power as a source of rivalry and conflict. 
This paper constructs a theoretical framework to analyse normative power 
rivalry, then applies it to the interactions of the European Union and Russia on the 
question of Kosovo (1997-2008). This will shed new light onto the new concept of 
normative power rivalry and aid our understanding of the European Union’s 
relationship with Russia as well as possibly its interactions with other great powers. 
The question when the norms of the European Union lead to normative power 
rivalry and conflict with other normative powers guides this paper. In particular it will 
be asked what role norms played in the interaction between the European Union 
and Russia over the issue of Kosovo and the rivalry and conflict that unfolded 
between the two actors. This question builds on the assumption that international 
actors have certain norms they wish to establish in the international community. 
Norms in this context are principles or rules that guide the behaviour of international 
actors. They can lead to rivalry between different actors when those actors push for 
incompatible norms. Rivalry in this context implies that two or more international 
actors strive for discordant goals in a zero-sum fashion. It can turn into conflict when 
actors seek to undermine others’ goal-seeking capabilities. Further, a definition of 
what qualifies as foreign policy action of the European Union is required. Here the 
foreign policy of the European Union is understood to include all coordinated actions 
of the European member states as well as actions conducted under the EU flag. 
The hypothesis of this paper holds that the greater the clash of relevant norms 
between the European Union and any normative rival, the greater the likelihood of 
conflict. It is important to note that the clashing norms must be relevant to the issues 
in question. In this case the different interpretations of sovereignty, international law 
and multilateralism that the European Union and Russia tried to advance as well as 
the and different perceptions about the self clashed on nearly all points. This 
accumulation of clashes made rivalry and conflict between the two actors over 
Kosovo very likely. 
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In order to answer the question laid out above, this paper first presents a 
constructivist framework of analysis and the concept of normative power. It then 
identifies the norms the European Union and Russia strive to advance in international 
relations by creating two normative templates which form the principal tools for the 
subsequent analysis. The case study then analyses how these norms led to conflict 
between the two actors during the crises in Kosovo in the late 1990s and in 2007.  
 
2. “Normative Power Is What States Make of It” 
2.1 A Constructivist Approach 
This paper relies on constructivism as developed by Alexander Wendt. 1 Wendt 
argues that social phenomena such as norms, threats, power and identities are 
constructed through processes of interaction that create collective meaning. 2  
Identities only acquire meaning when they are seen relative to the identities and 
norms of others. The identity of the United States as the defender of democracy, for 
instance, is thus the result of its interaction with monarchies at the time of its 
independence, with authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War and with Islamist terrorists today.  
Unlike rationalist schools of thought, which focus on cost-benefit calculations 
as the logic underlying the behaviour of states, and unlike neorealism, which regards 
the actions of states as the result of the power distribution in the international system, 
constructivists assume that identities are “the basis of interests”.3 During the Cold War, 
for instance, the United States and the Soviet Union constructed a relationship of 
hostility which defined the interests of both parties. Britain on the other hand was 
regarded as an ally by the Americans. Consequently, Soviet missiles stationed in 
Cuba affected American interests differently than the existence of British 
intercontinental missiles – regardless of their equally destructive power.4 As identities 
are “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about the self”,5 
they can, to a large extent, be regarded as given. A case in point would be the 
                                                 
1 See most importantly in Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It – the Social 
Construction of Power Politics”, International Organisation, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 398. 
4 Ibid., p. 396. 
5 Ibid., p. 397. 
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transatlantic identity of many European states which, although not a cast-iron 
institution, has become a highly significant social fact in the international system.6 
Constructivism is particularly apt for the purpose of this paper as the European 
Union is an international organisation based on shared values and norms. More 
importantly, however, the concept of normative power is constructivist and requires 
a corresponding theoretical framework. 
 
2.2 The Concept of Normative Power 
In discussions about normative power Ian Manners’ approach has become the point 
of reference. 7  His definition contains two different interpretations of the word 
normative. The first of these is prescriptive, according to which normative powers 
strive to do what is good and “should be done in international politics”.8 Relying 
upon our conception of ‘good’, this definition leads quickly to irresolvable debates 
between cultural relativists and universalists. In order to avoid this problem this paper 
relies on a second, more basic interpretation, according to which a normative 
power has the “ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics”.9 This 
definition can more easily be applied to non-Western states and to empirical 
research. Tocci claims that this definition, if pushed to extremes, could be applied to 
all states.10 Not all international actors, however, are equally normative or have an 
equally strong sense of mission. Following Wendt, normative power is what states 
make of it, and it is worth analysing what normative power is. 
 
3. Profiling Normative Power 
This part creates two normative templates by identifying the normative nature of the 
European Union and Russia through their values, their norms and their underlying 
identities.  
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 399. 
7 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258. 
8 Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, 
Millennium, vol. 35, no. 1, 2006, p. 168. 
9 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, op.cit., p. 236. 
10  Nathalie Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global 
Partners”, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Who Is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?, Brussels, Centre 
for European Studies, 2008, p. 4. 
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3.1 The European Union as a Normative Power 
3.1.1 Framework in which European Identity Is Formed 
The Union’s norms have their roots in the European Treaties and the common 
constitutional principles of the member states. Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union holds that the 
“Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation […] and which it seeks 
to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law”.11 
These aims are also expressed in the European Security Strategy12 and the 1993 
Copenhagen accession criteria. Due to their domestic importance these norms have 
become defining elements of the Union’s foreign policy identity and have been 
projected onto the international scene by the Union in the conduct of its external 
relations. These norms are firmly rooted and locked into the European foreign policy 
system and thus stable. The unanimity requirement for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) measures makes it nearly impossible to adopt positions that run counter 
to these norms. The 2003 Iraq War showed that the European Union would rather 
take no action at all than act against its principles. 
There are several ‘Others’ in the process of European identity formation. One 
is Europe’s war-torn past to which the European project is a powerful reaction; a 
second is the ‘not-yet-civilised world’. Cooper’s description of Europe as an 
advanced, post-modern international player is a case in point.13 The most important 
contemporary Other is the United States. Although generally perceived as a partner, 
the Union began to think of itself as a Western alternative to the US in view of the 
unilateral and hawkish foreign policy of the Bush administration.  
 
                                                 
11 European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C83, 30 March 2008. 
12 European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy”, 12 
December 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN, 
accessed 12 January 2009. 
13 Robert Cooper, “The New World Order”, in Robert Cooper (ed.), The Breaking of Nations: 
Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London, Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 16-54. 
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3.1.2 The Norms of the European Union 
The norms described below are part of the Union’s ambition of ‘domesticating’ 
international relations. Although easy to identify, it is difficult to clearly distinguish the 
norms from each other. This section attempts to give a brief outline of the norms that 
are most prominent in the external relations of the Union. 
 
Peace and Conflict Prevention 
Peace is particularly important. Ensuring peace on the Continent was the main 
purpose of the European project at its inception and the preamble of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union still lists “to preserve and strengthen 
peace and liberty” as a key objective of the Union.14 The Union is extremely reluctant 
to use military force and only does so when its use is deemed necessary for crisis 
management and averting humanitarian catastrophes. In other words, military 
power is only used in order to save lives. This aspect of European identity is reflected 
in the Union’s position on the Iranian nuclear programme. Compared to the United 
States, the European Union consistently gave greater emphasis to peaceful and 
diplomatic means to prevent Iran from acquiring the nuclear bomb. 
 
Rule of Law and Multilateralism 
The rule of law is a core norm which the Union seeks to upload into the international 
system in its attempts to domesticate the international system. It aims to create an 
international society in which law, not might, makes right. The Union regards the 
United Nations as the primary organisation for achieving a rule-based international 
society and supports it as the principal source of international law. It is important to 
note, however, that the European Union is prepared to deviate from a strict letter-by-
letter interpretation of international law if quick action is necessary to live up to the 
spirit of the law.15 
In this context the European Union attributes great importance to multilateral 
action. It regards international action as more legitimate if it is supported by a 
significant number of states than if it is unilateral. Being aware of the danger of large 
multilateral fora, such as the United Nations, possibly descending into mere talking 
                                                 
14  European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, C83, 30 March 2008. 
15   House of Commons, “Foreign Affairs - Fourth Report”, London, 23 May 2000, 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802. 
htm, accessed 12 March 2009. 
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shops, the European Union emphasises that multilateralism must be effective. In this 
context the Union supports quick action, even if it deviates from a strict letter-by-
letter interpretation of international law, as long as it is supported by a broad 
consensus in the international community. 
 
Liberty and Democracy 
From the European point of view liberty cannot be achieved without democracy. 
Unlike Russia’s concept of ‘sovereign Democracy’ or Asian countries’ particular 
‘models of democracy’, the European Union’s conception is based on its domestic 
pluralist systems. The promotion of liberty and democracy are inter alia advocated in 
the European Security Strategy. The insertion of good governance clauses in 
international agreements is part of the efforts to promote these values internationally. 
 
Human Rights 
All the aforementioned norms culminate in the Union’s strong support for human 
rights. It tries to defend human rights even when this incurs political costs, a fact 
illustrated by Europe’s delicate relationship with China and by the existence of the 
International Criminal Court which nearly all member states have joined in spite of 
strong American resistance. 
 
Transatlantic Alliance 
The transatlantic alliance must be added to this list of norms. Although the United 
States is often criticised by certain EU member states, most notably France, and 
although the relations between the Union and the United States have occasionally 
been tense over the past ten years, the transatlantic alliance remains a constant in 
the foreign policy of the European Union and in most cases Europeans seek to 
complement the United States in its international actions.16 This emphasis made its 
way into the European Security Strategy, which states that “[f]or Europe, the 
transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared 
history and responsibilities”.17  
 
                                                 
16 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International 
Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005, pp. 91-92. 
17  European Union, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – 
Providing Security in a Changing World”, December 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf, p. 12. 
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3.1.3 Foreign Policy Identity of the European Union 
In Europe many decision-makers, academics and the wider public are convinced 
that the European Union is a force for good in global politics. Unsurprisingly therefore, 
Europe possesses a strong sense of mission. The enlargement process demonstrates 
that the Union is even ready to transform its internal make-up for the sake of 
exporting its norms effectively. “The aim of enlargement is simple: to extend the area 
of peace, stability, democracy and the rule of law, and prosperity and well being 
throughout Europe.”18 This shows yet again that the Union is a value-driven actor, 
trying to spread its core norms of peace and conflict prevention, the rule of law and 
multilateralism, liberty, democracy and human rights. It seeks to reform the 
international system at large, ideally making the system more like itself. In sum, the 
European Union can be described as an increasingly proactive normative power. 
 
3.2 Russia as a Normative Power 
It is difficult to pinpoint norms in Russian foreign policy. In the Russian political system 
the President can exert strong influence on the country’s foreign policy according to 
personal beliefs and norms. Additionally, the process of identity transformation that 
began with perestroika and glasnost is ongoing. As a result, Russian foreign policy is 
marked by inherent contradictions and tensions.19 The identification of Russian norms 
and values is rendered more complex by the fact that Russian foreign policy has 
lately been reactive rather than proactive. 
 
3.2.1 Framework in which Russian Identity Is Formed 
The Other in the Russian process of identity formation is usually the West. As a former 
superpower, Russia defines itself globally in relation to the United States; it defines 
itself regionally in relation to Europe.  
The environment in which Russian foreign policy is conducted underwent 
significant changes around the turn of the century. During the Yeltsin years and the 
financial crisis of 1998, the “Russian government struggle[d] to provide the most 
elementary of public goods, such as a single currency, a common market, security, 
                                                 
18   European Commission, “Commissioner Olli Rehn”, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_ 
barroso/rehn/index_en.htm, accessed 14 February 2009. 
19 Bobo Lo, “Principles and Contradictions: The Foreign Policy of Vladimir Putin”, in Tanguy de 
Wilde and Laetitia Spetschinsky (eds.), La politique étrangère de la Russie et l’Europe: Enjeux 
d’une proximité, Brussels, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2004, p. 45. 
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welfare and education” 20  and was relegated to a mere observer status in 
international politics, only occasionally trying to catch the West’s attention. Under 
Putin “la Russie a retrouvé de véritables marges de manœuvre sur la scène 
internationale”21 due to his effective - if undemocratic - leadership and the rise in the 
price of oil. The oil price in particular has affected Russia’s capabilities as “every $1 
rise in the price of a barrel of oil represents a $1 billion increase in Russian 
government receipts”.22 In spite of these changes certain core norms appear to 
have been resistant to change. 
 
Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is regarded as the basis of the international community and features 
prominently in Russian political discourse. When the West started diluting the concept 
of unconditional sovereignty in the 1990s, and later when “the neo-conservatives in 
Washington stressed the […] global role that the promotion of democratic values 
should play, Moscow began to reassert an aggressive autonomy in international 
affairs, insisting on the sovereign right of each country”.23 States are free to act as 
they please internationally and are only limited by the idea that they should adhere 
to international law. Given the strongly Westphalian conception of sovereignty in 
Russia its most important aspect is strict non-interference in other states’ domestic 
affairs. According to a former Russian foreign minister, his country believes that any 
“attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of 
international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs”.24 
 
Territorial integrity 
Threatened by separatist movements in several parts of the country and having 
experienced the break-up of the Soviet Union, territorial integrity is a key norm of the 
Russian Federation. It is seen as one of the bases of international order and as a 
higher good than national self-determination. Opposing the latter except in cases of 
                                                 
20  Michael A. McFaul, “What Are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives? Testimony before the 
House Committee on International Relations”, 12 May 1999, http://www.carnegie 
endowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=424, accessed 16 January 2009. 
21 Thomas Gomart, “Politique étrangère russe – l’étrange inconstance”, Politique étrangère, 
vol. 1, 2006, p. 25. 
22 Richard Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics”, 
International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 2, 2008, p. 246. 
23 Ibid., p. 252. 
24  Russian Federation, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, June 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm, accessed 02 February 2009. 
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mutual agreement, 25 self-determination must be reached within the borders of 
existing states. This is reflected in Russia’s policies towards the Balkans, Cyprus, 
Chechnya and some regions of the former Soviet Union. 
 
Multipolarity 
Russia is a strong advocate of a multipolar world order. According to the Russian 
Foreign Policy Concept, unipolarity “leads to destabilization of international situation, 
provokes tensions and arms race, exacerbates interstate differences, stirs up ethnic 
and religious strife, endangers security of other States and fuels tensions in 
intercivilizational relations [sic]”.26 The United States are depicted as the source of 
unipolarity27 undermining the functioning of the United Nations, an organisation to 
which Russia attaches great significance. Multipolarity, by contrast, “really reflects 
the diversity of the modern world with its great variety of interests”.28 It leads to the 
democratisation of the international system and a better representation of a greater 
diversity of interests, especially those of Russia. 
It is important to note that this conception of multipolarity is different from 
European multilateralism. According to the Russian idea of multipolarity, several 
great powers shape the rules of international society in international fora or on 
bilateral bases. For Europe, however, it is not the number of poles that counts but the 
fact that the international system is governed by multilaterally agreed rules.29 
 
United Nations System 
Given the decline of Russian power to shape the international system outside the 
United Nations, Russia believes that its interests are best served in the context of the 
UN and its Security Council. Consequently, the “Russian Federation shall resolutely 
oppose attempts to belittle the role of the United Nations and its Security Council in 
world affairs”.30 In this body the great powers are supposed to work together to 
manage international relations, similar to the Concert of Europe system of the 
                                                 
25 James Headley, “Russia and ‘European Norms’, Paper presented at the British International 
Studies Association Annual Conference, Exeter, 15-17 December 2008”, cited with permission 
of author, http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2008/pps/Headley.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2009, p. 7. 
26   Russian Federation, “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, July 2008, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml, accessed 2 February 2009. 
27 Foreign Policy Concept 2000, op.cit. 
28 Ibid. 
29 European Commission, “Speech by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner – The EU, China 
and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, 4  July 2005, SP05-273EN, http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_4854_en.htm, accessed 12 December 2009. 
30 Foreign Policy Concept 2000, op.cit. 
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nineteenth century. Additionally Russia regards the UN Charter as the only legitimate 
source of international law and follows an extremely legalistic interpretation of it and 
its related body of law. The wording, especially with regard to territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, is sacrosanct. 
 
Great Powerness and NATO  
Russia’s self-image as a great power has outlasted the collapse of the Soviet Union. It 
regards itself as a global actor of particular international significance, emphasising in 
2000 that “Russia exerts significant influence on the formation of a new world 
order”.31 Maintaining this position is crucial to Russia, even when it comes at great 
cost. On a very thin economic base Russia supports an army of more than one 
million, commands the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, runs a truly global 
diplomacy and maintains a space programme, 32 all of which to justify Russia’s 
permanent membership of the Security Council. 
Russia’s fierce anti-NATO obsession dates back to Soviet times.33 NATO is seen 
as a means for America to impose a unipolar system on Europe and the world and to 
keep Cold War structures alive. 34  As an alternative, Russia proposes an open 
transatlantic space “from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its 
new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in 
the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period”.35 
 
Prestige 
Russia is marked by a remarkable desire for prestige. “[E]nsuring itself a worthy place 
in the world”36 is a declared objective. Some foreign policy actions, such as Russia’s 
involvement in the Middle East Quartet, are taken only to enhance Russia’s status in 
the world. Russia sees itself as “the largest EuroAsian power” with the “status as one 
of the leading States of the world and a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council”37 that deserves to be treated accordingly. Its desire for prestige is fuelled by 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis?”, op.cit., p. 246. 
33 Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes towards the EU: Political Aspects, Helsinki, The Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs, 2002, p. 41. 
34 Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia: a Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?”, International Affairs, 
vol. 76, no. 3, July 2008, p. 454. 
35 Foreign Policy Concept 2008, op.cit. 
36 Foreign Policy Concept 2000, op.cit. 
37 Ibid. 
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a fear that the West might regard it as a second-rank power,38 as indeed many 
academics did during the later Yeltsin years. Thomas Graham observed that “[i]t 
should be clear by now that Russia is no longer a Great Power. Over the past 
decade, it has endured a socio-economic collapse unprecedented for a major 
power, let alone a superpower, not defeated in a major war”.39 Such statements 
increased Russia’s pursuit of prestige and reinforced the Russian insistence that 
“[n]otwithstanding the strategic and economic decline of the past two decades, 
[…] Russia was, is and always will be ‘great’”.40 
 
Peace 
Russian publications on foreign policy reiterate the importance of peace and that 
Russia is not a warmongering power. However, war is regarded as a legitimate 
means to achieve foreign policy goals. 
 
3.2.2 Russian Foreign Policy Identity 
Constructivism holds that a state’s foreign policy interests are shaped on the basis of 
its identity and norms. The Russian Foreign Policy Concepts show that the country 
sees its interest best safeguarded in a system based on an unreformed United Nation 
Organisation with a strongly Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, and keeping 
alive the pre-globalisation idea of spheres of influence. Consequently, Russia can be 
described as a defensive normative power that aims at maintaining the current 
international system and opposes the introduction of new norms. 
 
4. Normative Power Rivalry over Kosovo (1997 to 2008) 
 
The following case study analyses EU-Russia interactions using the normative 
templates created above. It is an empirical study that aims to discover whether the 
norms and values previously identified did clash and, if so, which of them did. At the 
same time I analyse how these clashes led to rivalry and conflict. 
Kosovo provides a useful case for a constructivist study on the role of norms 
and values. Often the causes of conflict are reduced to ‘hard’ factors such as 
                                                 
38 Alfred Evans, “Putin's Legacy and Russia's Identity”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, no. 6, 2008, 
p. 907. 
39  Thomas Graham, “Russia's Foreign Policy”, Symposium at the Royal Defence College, 1 
March 2000, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 
529&prog=zru, accessed 02 February 2009. 
40 Lo, “Principles and Contradictions”, op.cit., p. 64. 
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natural resources or influence in strategically important areas. Kosovo has no such 
things to offer. It is tiny in terms of size, population and economic influence, and 
possesses no major natural resources. European and Russian strategic interests in the 
region are negligible;41 any other Balkan country is strategically more relevant than 
Kosovo. Furthermore, no security issues were at stake for either side. Though refugee 
waves did pose a problem for the European Union, they did not necessitate a war. 
Geographically, however, Kosovo is in proximity to both Russia and the European 
Union, without sharing a common border, and is close enough for both parties to 
take an interest in developments in this area, an area which realists would describe 
as their ‘spheres of influence’. 
This implies that European and Russian involvement in Kosovo cannot be 
attributed to security or material interests; rather, norms can explain why Russia and 
the European Union engaged in a diplomatic struggle that was costly for both sides. 
The case study focuses on the eleven years between 1997 and 2008. Of 
course, the history of conflict in Kosovo extends further, but it became most 
prominent in 1998 when news about ethnic cleansing and genocide made 
headlines in the West. After NATO’s bombing campaign Kosovo in March 1999 
shifted out of the limelight. Nine years later, Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
on 18 February 2008 stirred emotions once more but soon afterwards Kosovo 
disappeared again from headlines.  
 
4.1 Background to the Normative Clash 
The end of the Cold War heralded the end of the existing world order; throughout 
the 1990s it was widely felt that a new order was in the making. In this context, 
Western powers advanced the principle of humanitarian intervention and began 
intervening in African countries to protect human lives. At the same time, Western 
powers debated whether NATO should function as the world’s ‘policeman’. During 
the Kosovo crisis, a humanitarian intervention was about to happen on European soil 
for the first time, placing the world at a crossroads. In Joschka Fischer’s words, the 
“the Kosovo conflict also marks a change of direction in the development of 
international relations. How will the international community decide in future […] 
when it comes to preventing massive human rights violations against an entire 
                                                 
41 David Mendeloff, “‘Pernicious History’ as a Cause of National Misperceptions: Russia and 
the 1999 Kosovo War”, Conflict and Cooperation, vol. 43, no. 31, 2008, p. 32. 
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people?”42 For Russia and the European Union this was the crucial question, making 
Kosovo a matter of principle and precedent for the international system. Accordingly, 
all players felt stakes were high. 
In this international debate the member states of the European Union sided 
with the United State and took a proactive stance. Driven by its sense of mission, the 
Union wanted to project its own, allegedly universal, principles into the international 
system. By building its own common defence policy the European Union was 
preparing for this. 
Russia took a defensive position in this debate, as it did not want to see the 
rules of the international system changed. Some Russian norms proved to be less 
compatible with European ones than others, and the next part of this paper analyses 
which norms primarily conflicted. In practice, however, it is impossible to clearly 
separate one norm from another. It is also difficult to attribute specific actions to 
specific normative clashes. Rather, a reaction is most likely a response to an 
accumulation of different clashes. However, for the sake of clarity, this paper, 
wherever possible, treats these clashes as separate. 
 
4.2 Sovereignty versus Human Rights 
Russia wanted Yugoslav sovereignty to be protected by the international 
community. Insisting that whatever happens within the borders of Yugoslavia did not 
concern the international community, Russia “regarded Kosovo as an issue for 
Yugoslavia to resolve without pressure from outside, and certainly not with the threat 
or use of force.”43 When the NATO campaign against Serbia began in March 1999, 
Russia was outraged.44 Its foreign minister Primakov was on a flight to the United 
States when Al Gore informed him that the campaign would begin. Primakov 
immediately ordered his plane to turn back. This was a powerful symbolic gesture. 
Russia also resorted to stronger diplomatic instruments. Supported by Belarus and 
India, it introduced a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling for the 
                                                 
42  Joschka Fischer, Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, at the Fifty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New 
York, 22 September 1999, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/ 
Reden/Archiv/2000/990922-UNSessionPDF.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 
43 James Headley, Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin, London, Hurst 
and Company, 2008, p. 419. 
44 Statement by Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Lavrov, March 24, 1999”, in Philip Auerswald 
and David Auerswald, The Kosovo Conflict, Cambridge, Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 
728-729. 
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immediate cessation of the use of force against Yugoslavia45 and declared that it 
would not accept infringements of sovereignty. Russia did not, however, limit itself to 
symbols and diplomacy; it also turned to military means. When war was imminent on 
23 March 1999, it reportedly tried to supply Serbia with military equipment for the 
defence of its sovereignty against NATO aggression. The weaponry did not reach 
Serbia only because the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities did not grant the cargo 
planes delivering these arms access to their airspace.46 
This conflict between Russia and the West had its roots in their different 
interpretation of the events in Kosovo. Reports about mass expulsions, which deeply 
concerned the European and American publics, were “dismissed by Russia out of 
hand”47 as the Russian focus was not on human suffering but on the rights of the 
state. Inspired by the traditional Russian norm of sovereignty, President Yeltsin 
believed that “when you violate the rights of a state, you automatically and 
egregiously violate the rights of its citizens, including their right to security”.48 With 
regard to the Milosevic regime Europeans found this logic hard to follow but to 
Russians it made sense. Kosovar Albanians were not regarded as victims of a ruthless 
dictator but as terrorists who tried to break up an internationally recognised state.49 
To Russia, supporting the terrorists in their challenge of sovereignty seemed perverse. 
Rather, Russia believed that the international community should have tried to 
strengthen and defend Yugoslavia’s sovereignty. 
It is often argued that Russia’s insistence on sovereignty was a poorly disguised 
attempt to prevent interference with its own internal affairs; indeed some Russian 
newspapers fuelled the fear that Kosovo was only a prelude to Chechnya. There is 
no indication, however, that the West ever planned to turn against Russia militarily. 
On the contrary, in the late 1990s Western criticism of the Chechen War was toned 
down and the Union kept a low profile on the matter, which significantly weakens 
the explanatory power of this argument. 
Europe’s set of values was incompatible with Russia’s. Through the use of force 
Europe wanted to “guarantee our fundamental European values, i.e. respect for 
                                                 
45 Headley, Russia and the Balkans, op.cit., p. 372. 
46 “Russian Arms Shipment Signals Worsening Relations with West”, Asia Times, 24 March 1999, 
http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/AC25Ag01.html, accessed 22 March 2009. 
47 Mendeloff, “‘Pernicious History’, op.cit., p. 32. 
48 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, New York, Public Affairs, 2000, p. 265. 
49  See for instance “Statement by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, April 2, 1998”, in P. and D Auerswald, The Kosovo Conflict, op.cit., p. 144. 
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human rights and the rights of minorities”.50 Most Europeans believed that “NATO 
[was] in the business of defending common values […]. Our shared values – 
freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights – are themselves 
every bit as much worth defending as is our territory”.51 Overriding sovereignty, 
Europe’s top priority was to solve the humanitarian catastrophe that unfolded on the 
Continent. European heads of states and governments declared that 
“[i]t cannot be permitted that […] the predominant population of 
Kosovo is […] subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the 
countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to 
ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which became 
tangible in […] January 1999, are not repeated. We have a duty to 
ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of thousands of 
refugees and displaced persons.”52  
If necessary, the European Union was prepared to live up to its moral obligations 
without a Security Council mandate. It was believed that Serbia followed “actual or 
quasi-genocidal policies of ‘ethnic cleansing’ involving a wholesale driving out of the 
Kosovar Albanian population and in its course increasing evidence of kidnap, forced 
labour and mass murder in a manner not seen in Europe since the demise of the 
Third Reich”. 53 In the eyes of most Europeans, Serbia had forfeited its right to 
sovereignty through its grave human rights violations. 
In addition to stopping the genocide, the European Union tried to establish 
the principle of humanitarian intervention internationally. This is for example evident 
in the British House of Commons’ statement that its Kosovo Committee “support[ed] 
the FCO in its aim of establishing in the United Nations new principles governing 
humanitarian intervention.”54 In this instance, human rights trumped sovereignty. 
 
4.3 International Law versus Effective Multilateralism 
Russia and the Union had different ideas about how to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Led 
by its preference for the United Nations System the former wanted to solve the crisis 
entirely within the framework of this body. Only through the Security Council could 
                                                 
50 European Union, “Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24-25 March 1999”. 
51 Alexander Vershbow quoted in Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the 
Evolution of post-Cold War European Security, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, 
p. 163. 
52 European Union, “Presidency Conclusions”, op.cit. 
53 Hilaire McCoubrey, “Kosovo, NATO and International Law”, International Relations, vol. 14, 
1999, p. 30. 
54 House of Commons, “Fourth Report”, op.cit. 
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Russia ensure by peaceful means that its interpretation of international law was 
respected.  
The European Union, however, knew that the United Nations’ procedures 
would stop it from acting effectively because “it had been clear since June 1998 
that China and Russia would veto any authorisation of Chapter VII intervention in 
Kosovo”.55 This posed a problem for the Union because a Security Council mandate 
was considered a prerequisite for the use of force in many European capitals. 
Despite their initial reservations, the member states of the European Union declared 
that they were willing to act outside the traditional legal framework should all efforts 
to obtain a Security Council mandate fail. The member states would go ahead in 
spite of Russian opposition in order to defend their allegedly universal values. They 
decided to act through more effective international institutions than the paralysed 
United Nations and turned to NATO. At an informal European Council meeting on 14 
April 1999 it was concluded that the “Heads of State and Government […] believe 
that the use of the severest measures, including military action, has been both 
necessary and warranted”.56 Later this approach whereby traditional authorities of 
international law would be circumvented if t h e y  p r o v e  t o  b e  a n  o b s t a c l e  t o  t h e  
achievement of allegedly higher goals and are replaced by a broad consensus 
among the members of international society, would come to be called ‘effective 
multilateralism’. 
Russia, on the other hand, wanted to preserve the status quo. It insisted on 
discussing the political mechanisms for settling the crisis in Kosovo in the Security 
Council. When the bombing went ahead, Russia insisted NATO’s actions were illegal 
and that Yugoslavia fell victim to “a flagrant act of aggression against a sovereign 
state”.57 Russia was appalled to see the norms laid out in the UN Charter so blatantly 
violated and regarded the bombings as an affront to itself and an attack on the 
entire United Nations system. According to Yeltsin, a “dangerous precedent ha[d] 
been created regarding the policy of diktat and force, and the whole of the 
international rule of law ha[d] been threatened”.58 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56  United Nations, “Chairman’s Summary of the Deliberations on Kosovo at the Informal 
Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union held at Brussels on 14 
April 1999”. 
57 Headley, Russia and the Balkans, op.cit., p. 366. 
58 Quoted in Headley, Russia and the Balkans, op.cit., p. 367. 
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4.4 NATO versus Russian Great Powerness, Prestige and Multipolarity 
European support for NATO was, and still is, a thorn in Russia’s side. NATO’s mere 
existence is enough to cause ill feelings in Russia. It is regarded as an anti-Russian 
organisation and a threat to its great power status. The airstrikes against Serbia were 
also perceived as an affront to Russia. General Ivashov complained that NATO 
“treated us as a fifth-rate power”.59 This humiliation was particularly painful because 
Russia’s international status had suffered greatly following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
Statements by Russian officials show how rivalry over this issue turned into 
conflict. Their rhetoric became increasingly aggressive. “The military, among others, 
urged Russian decision-makers to ignore the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavia and 
supply Serbia with military aid [… and] even liberal politicians encouraged Russian 
volunteers to fight alongside Serbia”.60 Some “political and military officials spoke of 
re-targeting nuclear missiles”61 and Russia sent a warship to the Adriatic Sea that was 
supposed to supply Serbian troops with intelligence. Such displays of power again 
caused concern when Russia sent paratroopers to Pristina in order to secure a 
military zone for itself in Kosovo after the bombings. Ivashov claimed that “if we had 
retreated [from our insistence on a military zone], the world would have taken it as a 
serious defeat […]. Our positions in Europe would have been undermined”.62  
European support for NATO also collided with the value Russia attaches to 
multipolarity. Igor Ivanov stated that “the real reasons [for NATO’s actions] are 
obvious – to establish such a unipolar world order […], where the world’s fate would 
have to be decided from Washington”,63 regarding them as “the latest form of neo-
colonialism, the so-called NATO-colonialism”.64 He emphasised that in response to 
the airstrikes “we will strive even more energetically to shape a democratic multi-
polar world”.65 Interestingly, none of the mainstream politicians in the European 
Union perceived the US as a neo-colonial power on the Continent. On the contrary, 
there was a palpable sense of shared ownership in spite of NATO being an 
American-led organisation, as Europe could not have stopped the humanitarian 
                                                 
59 Vladimir Brovkin, Discourse on NATO in Russia during the Kosovo War, op.cit., p. 26. 
60 Mendeloff, “‘Pernicious History’”, op.cit., p. 32. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Brovkin, “Discourse on NATO”, op.cit., p. 26. 
63 Quoted in Headley, Russia and the Balkans, op.cit., p. 369. 
64 Ivanov quoted in Mendelhoff, “Pernicious History”, op.cit., p. 47. 
65  “Ivanov in the Duma”, in Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 484. 
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catastrophe on its own. Although all European member states were extremely 
uncomfortable about having acted without a Security Council mandate, they 
believed that acting through NATO, a multilateral organisation, had increased the 
legitimacy in comparison to unilateral action at least slightly. 66 
                                                
 
4.5 The Role of Peace 
It has been shown that Western behaviour triggered intensely rivalrous behaviour on 
Russia’s part which reached from symbolic gesturing to military action. For several 
reasons, however, the conflict did not lead to war. 
The central norm of the European Union is the maintenance of peace; it is its 
raison d’être. Russia too emphasises the importance of peace although the events in 
Chechnya and in Georgia show that it deems the use of force a legitimate means to 
achieve political ends. War with the member states of the European Union, however, 
was clearly not in its interest. Yeltsin realised “that much progress had been made 
over the years […] and that this should not be jeopardised, certainly not for the sake 
of Milosevic”.67 A war with the West would also run counter to Russia’s attachment to 
the United Nations system. War with permanent members of the Security Council 
would entail the collapse of the existing world order. 
Another reason why this conflict of interests between Russia and the West did 
not turn into war was because the European Union, in its attempts to resolve conflicts 
peacefully and multilaterally, tried to accommodate Russia’s demands and 
integrated it in all diplomatic attempts to end the bombing campaign. Russia was 
given an active role in the Contact Group, in devising the Fischer Plan, in dispatching 
Ahtisaari to Belgrade and in the peacekeeping mission that followed the air 
campaign. Neither side wanted the conflict to escalate too far. 
 
4.6 Conflict Prevention versus Territorial Integrity – Ten Years Later 
Following a preliminary peace settlement in 1999, Kosovo became a de facto United 
Nations protectorate and soon faded out of the headlines. Increasingly, however, 
the Kosovar Albanians grew dissatisfied with the status quo. Mounting popular 
pressure for a unilateral declaration of independence in 2007 brought Russia and the 
 
66 This self-justification becomes evident in Javier Solana, “NATO's Success in Kosovo”, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 78, no. 6, November/December, 1999, p. 118, where Solana writes: “It was the 
unique allied cohesion of 19 democracies, including NATO's three new members, that was 
crucial in establishing consensus on the legal basis and legitimacy of NATO's actions.” 
67 Quoted in Headley, Russia and the Balkans, op.cit., p. 373. 
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European Union back on the scene. Norms had not changed on either side: Russia 
was still fundamentally opposed to an independent Kosovo as this ran counter to its 
norm of territorial integrity and was considered illegal under international law. 
Although the EU did not support secession, consensus emerged relatively quickly 
among its member states that an independent Kosovo would be acceptable for the 
sake of conflict prevention, thereby granting de facto recognition. Morally, it was felt 
that Serbia had lost its right to govern Kosovo after the grave atrocities committed 
against the Albanian population. 
Russia, believing that territorial integrity and sovereignty cannot be revoked, 
did not follow this line of reasoning. In the run-up to independence it tried to prevent 
the breaking away of Kosovo at all levels. In the United Nations it vetoed UN envoy 
Martti Ahtisaari’s plan which advocated internationally-supervised independence; 
President Putin and his foreign minister Lavrov warned at every possible occasion 
against the negative repercussions independence would have for the future of 
international relations. Russia tried to get the declaration of independence annulled 
at the UN only hours after it had been passed by Kosovo’s Regional Assembly. Unlike 
ten years earlier, however, Russia abstained from major diplomatic gestures and 
military action. 
In 2007 the rivalry between Russia and the European Union was decidedly less 
intense. This can be explained by the fact that fewer of their norms clashed. Russia 
had regained its confidence and unlike in the late 1990s its great power status was 
undisputed if only because of the high gas price. Furthermore, NATO was not 
involved and hence Russia’s anti-NATO norm did not come into play and, since the 
West did not use force, the violation of the United Nations Charter was less obvious. It 
is in fact arguable whether the actions of the European Union can be considered at 
all contradictory to the Charter. 
Additionally, the sense of urgency that prevailed in the 1990s had 
disappeared. In hindsight, Kosovo in 1999 did not prove to be the watershed 
moment it was thought to be at the time. NATO interventions without a UN mandate 
did not become the norm in the international system. This empirical fact led Russia to 
weigh its norms differently in 2007. 
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5. Conclusions: Normative Power Rivalry, Constructivism and the EU-Russia 
Relationship – What Can Be Learnt? 
 
At the outset of this paper it was stipulated that the greater the clash between 
relevant norms, the more likely it is that differences between them will lead to rivalry 
and conflict. This hypothesis can be confirmed. This finding is not without irony, given 
the fact that generally the norms of the European Union are thought to make the 
world better, safer and more peaceful. The case study has also confirmed that the 
likelihood of conflict increases with the seriousness and the number of normative 
clashes. This becomes particularly apparent when comparing the situation of the 
late 1990s with the situation surrounding Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 
2007. As fewer norms clashed, rivalry and conflict were less intense. 
The case study has also shown that the altered international situation played 
a role in alleviating the intensity of rivalry. Russia’s improved international status as 
well as a change in the international discourse on the role of humanitarian 
intervention reduced the explosive force of the Kosovo issue. This finding is interesting 
because it demands an extension of the original hypothesis which ignores the 
influence that external circumstances have on the weighting of norms and thus on 
actors’ behaviour. The framework presented here does not provide mechanisms that 
help determine the circumstances that lead to a different weighting. It is desirable to 
extend the scope of the framework in this direction to determine the conditions 
influencing actors’ prioritisation of different norms because such a modification 
would increase its predictive power. 
This paper also sheds light on constructivism in International Relations theory. It 
was shown that it can explain phenomena that rationalist theories cannot account 
for. Realism, and neorealism in particular, could not have explained Russian and 
European involvement in Kosovo, let alone normative power rivalry between the 
two. It also confirms the (moderate) constructivist assumption that it is impossible to 
separate values from interests. Values are indeed constructed on the basis of 
interests. 
From a methodological point of view, the framework presented here has 
proven useful. One of its great advantages is its broad applicability. It can easily be 
applied to other instances in the relations between the European Union and Russia. It 
could also be applied to other countries or, with some modifications, to other issue 
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areas, such as negotiations on trade or climate change. In this case, the normative 
templates laid out above would need to be revised in order to reflect the norms 
most significant for such discussions. The European norm of sustainability, for instance, 
would certainly play a more prominent role than the norm of democracy in climate 
change negotiations. 
Aside from theoretical implications, this paper also allows for political 
conclusions. The European Union can infer that it is well advised to continue its long-
term project of a milieu foreign policy that aims at slowly convincing its partners to 
adopt European norms. Europe’s normative milieu foreign policy is often perceived 
as inefficient because it does not produce immediate results but the findings of this 
paper suggest that norms are vital in determining the behaviour and interests of a 
state. Therefore it is worth continuing to invest in them. 
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